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Abstract
This paper examines the overall macroeconomic impact arising from reform in government 
wages and employment, at times of fi scal consolidation. Reform of these two components of 
the government wage bill appeared necessary for containing the deterioration of the public 
fi nances in several EU countries, as a consequence of the fi nancial crisis. Such reforms 
entailed in some instances, but not always, the implementation of cost cutting measures 
affecting the government wage bill, as part of broader consolidation packages that typically 
hinged more heavily on other fi scal instruments, like public investment. While such measures 
have adverse short-term macroeconomic effects, public wage bill restraining policy changes 
present the idiosyncrasy that they can yield medium- to longer-term benefi ts due to possible 
competitiveness and effi ciency gains through their impact on labour market dynamics. This 
paper provides some evidence of such medium- to long-run effects, based on a wealth of 
micro and macro data in the euro area and the EU. It concludes that appropriately designed 
government wage bill moderation could indeed produce positive dividends to the economy, 
which depend on certain country-specifi c conditions. These gains can be reinforced by 
relevant fi scal-structural reforms.
Keywords: public employment, public wages, labour market, fi scal policies, fi scal 
consolidation.
JEL classifi cation: H50, E62, J45.
Resumen
Este artículo examina el impacto macroeconómico de la implementación de reformas en el 
ámbito de los salarios y el empleo público, en particular en momentos de consolidación fi scal. 
La reforma de la masa salarial de las Administraciones Públicas (AAPP) ha formado parte de 
las estrategias de respuesta a las consecuencias de la crisis de deuda soberana en numerosos 
países de la Unión Europea. Dichas reformas implicaron, en algunos casos, la introducción de 
medidas de ahorro, como parte de paquetes de ajuste fi scal que habitualmente han pesado 
más sobre el uso de otros instrumentos presupuestarios, en particular, la inversión pública.
En general, las medidas de ajuste fi scal, de acuerdo con los modelos y estimaciones de 
multiplicadores fi scales disponibles, habrían tenido efectos adversos sobre el crecimiento 
económico en el corto plazo. No obstante, en el caso concreto de las orientadas a contener 
la masa salarial de las AAPP, dado que su impacto incide de manera directa en la dinámica 
del mercado de trabajo, parte de estos efectos de corto plazo se podrían compensar, de 
acuerdo con la evidencia disponible, a través de las potenciales ganancias de competitividad y 
efi ciencia que pudieran producirse. En este artículo se proporciona evidencia de estos efectos 
de medio y largo plazo, sobre la base de información macro y microeconómica para el área del 
euro y la Unión Europea en su conjunto. Se concluye que, para que estos efectos mitigadores 
aparezcan, las políticas de reforma de la masa salarial de las AAPP deben diseñarse con una 
orientación de medio plazo (reformas estructurales). Asimismo, se discute el modo en que 
dichos efectos dependen de circunstancias idiosincrásicas de los países (tales como el marco 
institucional).
Palabras clave: empleo público, salarios públicos, mercado de trabajo, política fi scal, 
consolidación fi scal.
Códigos JEL: H50, E62, J45.
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Non technical summary
The government wage bill can be broken down into two elements: government employment 
and compensation per government employee (wages). In the euro area, the government wage 
bill accounts for almost a quarter of total government expenditure and around 10% of GDP, 
hence its relevance from a macroeconomic standpoint. Restraint of the government wage bill 
played a role in the recent fi scal consolidation episode, with actions on this front being part of 
broader policy packages that typically hinged more heavily on other fi scal instruments, like public 
investment. These policy measures have to be assessed against the signifi cant episode of stress 
that affected the public budgets of a number of EU countries during the sovereign crisis period. 
Changes to the government wage bill need to be assessed in comparison with 
developments in the private sector. Regarding wages, the growth per government employee was 
higher compared to the private sector in the initial phase of the crisis (2007-2010), as the latter 
was hit more immediately by the economic recession. The cumulative excess was then mostly 
reversed over 2010-2014 by public wage containment policies, including wage freezes, but also 
nominal reductions in salaries and benefi ts in some cases. There was substantial heterogeneity 
across EU countries in the evolution of public wages and employment. 
The recent cost-cutting public wage bill measures were mainly driven by fi scal 
consolidation requirements. It has been argued that these adjustments may have entailed costs 
in terms of output losses and higher unemployment. However, such adverse macroeconomic 
effects are largely felt, if anything, in the short run.
Notwithstanding the direct adverse short term macroeconomic effects, there are benefi ts 
from government wage bill reform that go beyond the objective of fi scal consolidation. Under 
certain macroeconomic and institutional conditions, a rationalisation of government wages and 
employment policies can generate favourable labour market effects in the medium to longer term 
through competitiveness and effi ciency gains. Competitiveness gains materialise through the 
spillovers effects of public wage moderation on the determination of private sector wages. There 
is scope for public wage adjustments in the case of positive differentials compared to private 
wages, which go beyond what could be explained by differences in workers’ characteristics, 
such as the level of education. Effi ciency gains from public employment reform arise when 
public sector activity partially competes with the private sector (in the production of individual, 
non-collective public goods, like in the education or health sectors). A decrease in public hours 
worked to produce substitutable products can lead to the private sector crowding out public 
jobs. Nevertheless, when public sector activity complements private sector productivity (through 
the provision of collective goods, like the judicial system), such policies would only affect positively 
private employment if targetted to increasing the effi cient provision of such public goods.
An important aspect of the debate on public wage bill restraint concerns how long such 
policies can be sustained over time. In countries where fi scal consolidation needs are still high, 
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recent government wage bill savings would need to be preserved. Additional margins of short- 
term adjustment include the moderation of still high public-to-private wages gaps, or a possible 
continuation of the downsizing trend in public employment, depending on the country specifi c 
situation. In any case, as regards restraint of real public wages, historical experience shows that 
catching-up processes in good economic times tend to partially or completely offset crisis related 
budgetary savings. As regards falls in public employment, a signifi cant portion of the savings 
observed during the consolidation period hinged on workers with temporary contracts. Thus, 
the employment adjustment was more of a cyclical-like reaction than a permanent reduction, a 
fact which is emphasised in this paper.
Finally, the paper argues that reforms affecting public sector personnel are most 
effective and have more sustained effects when the measures implemented are of a structural 
nature, beyond those aimed at immediate public defi cit reduction, such as the ones resulting 
from broad-based ongoing public spending reviews in several EU countries. Structural measures 
impinge on government effi ciency and thus on overall economy productivity. Some examples 
are human management/pay reforms, improvements in wage bargaining mechanisms within the 
government sector, or measures to streamline the size and scope of government.
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1 Introduction
Government wages and employment are the two components of the so called “government 
wage bill”, which accounts for almost a quarter of total public spending in the EU. Public wage 
expenditure also plays an important role in aggregate demand, as the government wage bill 
accounts for around 10% of GDP1. These fi gures refl ect the importance of the government as an 
employer: around 20% of the labour force in the EU is employed in the government sector. Thus, 
the public wage bill is an important consolidation instrument when fi scal rebalancing is needed. 
In fact, empirical evidence shows that reductions in the public wage bill are robustly associated 
with the success of fi scal consolidation episodes. Over the recent period of fi scal retrenchment 
(2010-2014) the adjustment of the euro area aggregate government wage bill accounted for 
10% of the improvement in the structural general government balance-to-GDP ratio. In any 
case, there was a large cross country heterogeneity of policy responses regarding government 
wage bill reductions. Moreover, many governments opted for consolidating strongly through 
other fi scal instruments, with a particular recourse to cuts in public investment.
It is widely acknowledged in the literature that fi scal adjustment tends to generate direct 
adverse short-term economic impacts. In the particular case of the public sector wage bill, 
though, these tend to be milder compared to other fi scal instruments2. This is so because 
the short-term negative impact is mitigated by indirect favourable labour market effects in the 
medium-term. Public wage moderation impinges on the overall cost-competitiveness of the 
economy through linkages with private sector wage setting3, in particular when positive public 
private wage gaps4 are reduced. Moreover, targeted adjustment of public employment may spur 
private employment5.
Sustained containment of the public wage bill is more likely to be achieved and 
maintained by countries that adopt a wide range of structural reforms beyond measures aimed at 
immediate public defi cit reduction6. Structural measures impinge on government effi ciency and 
thus on overall economy productivity. Some examples are human management/pay reforms, 
improvements in wage bargaining mechanisms within the government sector, or measures 
to streamline the size and scope of government. However, a careful analysis of public sector 
performance and effi ciency is warranted since some empirical evidence shows that public 
spending on health and education positively impact economic growth7.
1  On data sources and defi nitions see Appendix I. The cut off date for information included in this paper was October 
2015.
2 See for instance Alesina et al. (2002) and Hernández de Cos and Moral Benito (2016).
3  See for instance Alesina et al. (2002), Afonso and Gomes (2008), Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht (2012), Marzinotto and 
Turrini (2016) or Holm Hadulla, et al. (2010).
4 See, among others, Campos et al. (2015).
5 See for example Stepanyan and Leigh (2015), Algan et al. (2002), Lamo, Moral Benito and Pérez (2016).
6 See for instance IMF (2015) and Forni and Novta (2015)
7  Afonso and González Alegre (2011). It must be noted that around two thirds of government wage spending in the euro 
area takes place in these two areas of government.
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This paper reviews and provides evidence on these interrelated issues. The main 
contribution is the comprehensive set of micro and macro data used to support the analyses 
(see appendixes I, II and III).
Section 2 provides stylised facts on the role public wages and employment policies 
played during the most recent consolidation period in the euro area and the EU. It also discusses 
the supporting role of fi scal-structural policies when governments adopt consolidation measures 
through their wage bill. Section 3 analyses the possible channels of transmission of government 
wage bill policies into the economy. Section 4 sets out conclusions and provides key policy 
messages.
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2 The role of the government wage bill in the recent fiscal consolidation episode
This section describes the recent developments of the public wage bill from an aggregate 
perspective. This includes comparisons with medium term trends (since the early 1980s), with 
private sector developments, and with alternative fi scal consolidation instruments. Section 2.1 
focuses on the euro area as a whole, given the availability of historical aggregates. Section 2.2 
turns to individual country data, as the evolution of public wages and employment shows a 
signifi cant heterogeneity across countries.
2.1 Euro area aggregate trends
Until the beginning of the crisis (Chart 1), the aggregate euro area public wage bill as a fraction 
of GDP had been on a declining trend since the early 1980s. This trend had closed the historical 
gap with the US ratio by the beginning of the 2000s. The declining trend was only halted with 
the onset of the crisis, not only because of the fall in GDP (the denominator) but also because 
of positive year on year real growth rates of government wage bill spending up until 2010. The 
latter is to a large extent due to the generalised implementation of fi scal stimulus plans in the EU 
at the beginning of the crisis, under the umbrella of the so called European Economic Recovery 
Plan (see Bouthevillain et al., 2009). In fact, fi scal austerity plans started to affect the government 
sector wage bill from an aggregate point of view only as of 2010.
Between 2010 and 2014, there was a partial correction of the increase in the initial 
phase of the crisis. In particular, euro area aggregate government wage expenditure fell in 2010 
2012 in real terms and, as a consequence, the cumulative real increase between 2007 and 2014 
was contained to slightly below 2%. In turn, as a percent of total public spending, government 
wage expenditure continued on the pre crisis declining trend, while public employment fell as a 
percentage of the population after remaining broadly stable during the previous decade. From an 
aggregate perspective, the change in 2010 in government wage bill dynamics was mainly due 
to the decline in public employment. While over 2007 2010 real public wages per employee and 
public employment grew by 5.3% and 0.4%, respectively, between 2010 and 2014 employment 
fell and public wages were kept broadly constant in real terms. Thus, overall, between 2007 and 
2014 public employment dropped by 3.2%, while public wages increased by more than 5% in 
real terms.
Compared to the private sector, euro area aggregate public wage dynamics over 2007 
2014 were more expansionary while public employment losses were larger in percentage terms 
(Chart 2). Indeed, between 2007 and 2014 the wage bill in both the public and private sectors 
evolved in a broadly similar way, in cumulative terms, but the evolution of its two components 
–employment and wages– was quite different. Real wages grew more strongly in the public than 
in the private sector until 2010 (5.3% vs. 2.4%, in cumulative terms). However, since 2010 real 
public wages recorded a slight loss of below 0.5% compared to an increase of some 2% in the 
private sector. Overall, aggregate data show that the euro area government wage differential with 
respect to the private sector increased from 20% in 2007 to 25% in 2009, and subsequently fell 
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to 23% in 2014 owing to fi scal consolidation measures (Chart 2, lower panel). From a medium 
term perspective, these measures halted the upward trend in relative public-to-private wages 
witnessed since the beginning of the 1990s (when the gap was smallest, at just over 5%).
As regards employment, total cumulated losses were higher in the public sector over 
2007-2014, due to the adjustment in the second part of the period. In historical terms, this 
was the most signifi cant reduction of government employment in the last three decades. The 
reduction since the 2009 peak level of public employment was 3.5%, while in the previous 
episode that took place between 1992 and 1998, coinciding with the run up to the EMU period, 
it amounted to less than 1%. In fact, from an aggregate euro area perspective, the level of 
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on data from the national accounts and national sources (ESCB national central
banks databases), and ECB’s AWM database.
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SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on data from the national accounts and national sources (ESCB national central
banks databases), and ECB’s AWM database.
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AGGREGATE VIEW ON THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE PUBLIC WAGE BILL VERSUS OTHER FISCAL INSTRUMENTS
CHANGE IN THE RATIO OF THE FISCAL INSTRUMENT TO GDP: AGGREGATES (BARS) AND MEAN ACROSS 
COUNTRIES (DOTS)
  
CHART 3
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on the data from the national accounts and national sources (ESCB national central banks databases.
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government employment has remained almost constant at about 22 million persons since the 
beginning of the 1990s up to 2014, while private sector employment grew in the same period by 
some 20%. This explains the signifi cant fall in the share of public employment vis-à-vis private 
employment in the last two decades (Chart 2, lower panel).
Compared to other fi scal instruments, the containment of the public wage bill played a 
subdued role in the period of fi scal retrenchment (2010-2014) from a euro area and EU point of 
view (Chart 3). Nevertheless, there was large cross-country heterogeneity in the implemented 
public employment and wage policies, as analysed in Section 2.2 below. The adjustment of 
the euro area aggregate government wage bill accounted for 10% of the improvement in the 
structural general government budget balance-to-GDP ratio between 2010 and 2014 (15% for 
the EU as a whole). This share contrasts in particular with the role played by public investment 
(which represents a smaller part of overall expenditure)8, which accounted for almost 20% of the 
fi scal correction, and also with the contribution of the remaining expenditure (excluding social 
payments), mainly other capital expenditure and subsidies.
2.2 Cross country heterogeneity in the evolution of the public wage bill
The evolution of the public sector wage bill exhibited substantial cross country heterogeneity 
during the crisis (Chart 4). While a majority of countries reduced their public wage bill as a 
fraction of GDP between 2010 and 2014 (21 out 28 EU countries), with an average adjustment 
of 0.8 percentage points (p.p.) of GDP, the dispersion across countries was signifi cant, ranging 
from a fall of 1.8% of GDP (Portugal) to -0.01% (France). For the group of countries in which 
this ratio increased, the average was, in any case, moderate (+0.32 p.p.). Notwithstanding the 
restraining policy, general government compensation of employees grew faster than nominal 
GDP over the whole 2007-2014 crisis period (i.e. there was an increase in the ratio to nominal GDP, 
despite the 2010-2014 adjustment). 
8  For the entire 2007 2014 period, only 5 out of 28 EU countries registered a lower increase or a higher decrease in their 
ratio to GDP of government compensation to employees compared to the public investment to GDP ratio
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At the same time, though, the public sector wage bill fell as a proportion of total 
government expenditure during the crisis (2007-2014) in most EU countries (22 out of 28). This 
is broadly due to spending on social transfers (as a consequence of the acute impact of the 
crisis on employment) and interest expenditure (as a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis) 
exhibiting less restrain than the public wage bill. Within the wage bill, the variability of public 
employment and wages across countries was also substantial (Chart 4).
Despite the heterogeneity observed, some approximate common features of the fi scal 
adjustment effort can be highlighted (Chart 5). First, there is to some extent an association between 
the amount of adjustment implemented during the 2008-2014 period and the pre-crisis level of the 
public wage bill, measured either by its size in 2007 or by its medium-term pre-crisis dynamics 
(the top two panels in Chart 5). Second, countries that registered lower infl ation rates were the 
CROSS-COUNTRY HETEROGENEITY IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC WAGE BILL DURING THE RECENT 
FISCAL CONSOLIDATION EPISODE
(y-axis: government compensation of employees as a percent of GDP: 2014 (dots) and 2010; government compensation of employees 
as a percent of total public spending: change over 2010-2014; percentage change in public employment, 2010-2014; percentage change 
in public compensation per employee, 2010-2014, in real terms)
  
CHART 4
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on data from the National Accounts and national central banks (ESCB) databases.
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ones that reduced their public wage bills more in real terms. Third, lower real GDP growth rates 
were associated with higher real reductions in public wage spending.
As regards the type of public goods/services, the wage bill adjustment was evenly 
implemented between individual and collective ones, as between 2007 and 2013, the ratio 
between government wage expenditure in individual and collective goods/services remained 
broadly constant for most countries (Chart 6). Individual goods/services produced by 
general government are goods that can also be provided privately (according to international 
experiences), such as health, education and other services, while collective goods/services are 
typically provided in a quasi monopoly-fashion, and include defence, public order, the judiciary 
and regulation. The latter class complements private sector production. The former, however, 
can substitute private sector activity. Thus, the ratio of public wage expenditure in individual 
goods/services to public wage expenditure in collective good/services is an indicator of the 
degree of substitution of private activity by public activity9. According to the evidence shown in 
Chart 6, then, the crisis did not signifi cantly impinged on the existing cross country heterogeneity 
regarding the production of different types of public goods/services.
OVERALL FEATURES OF THE RECENT GOVERNMENT WAGE BILL ADJUSTMENT 
IN THE EU
(x-axis: 2008-2014, average real growth of the government wage bill)
CHART 5
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SOURCES: Authors’ calculations on the basis of national accounts and national central banks' databases. 
9  For one approximation to measure the elasticity of substitution between public and private employment, see Fernández 
de Córdoba, Pérez and Torres (2012a).
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2.3 The heterogeneity of policy responses 
Measures aimed at containing governments’ running costs (operational expenditure) were 
frequently used among EU countries in the 2007-2014 period, mainly from 2010 onwards. 
Government wage bill cost containment measures have been more frequent on the wage side, 
given the special status that (some) public sector employees enjoy as regards job security and 
redundancy (see Appendix III). The most common government wage measures were wage 
freezes and wage cuts, in some instances. A number of EU governments have implemented 
policies aimed at reducing staff numbers, particularly those with more strained public fi nances. 
The most common measures include new vacancy freezes and limitations on the replacement 
rate of retired workers.
Overall, public wage bill measures at the euro area aggregate level were limited, 
amounting to some 0.15% of euro area GDP per year during the 2010-2012 period, while 
they were negligible from an euro area aggregate perspective (Chart 7). Nevertheless, when 
accounting for individual country heterogeneity, the picture changes. The average amount of 
restraining measures implemented by the governments of the countries that actually adopted 
consolidation policies is much larger than the EU average number. These countries mainly 
included those under a fi nancial assistance programme (Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus), 
Spain, Italy, and Latvia.
Policy measures also targeted the number of hours worked per government employee 
in some countries, which created room for additional staff adjustments. The impact of these 
measures can be analysed by using micro data. According to EU SILC data (see Appendix I for 
PUBLIC WAGE EXPENDITURE BY TYPE OF PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES 
(individual and collective)
CHART 6
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on COFOG General Government National Accounts data (Eurostat).
NOTE: 2012 for Germany, Ireland, Greece, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Denmark, the UK, Romania, Bulgaria, and Malta.
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a description of this data source), hours worked in a typical week by employees in government- 
related activities increased during the recent fi scal consolidation period for the euro area as 
a whole and in particular in countries subject to greater fi scal stress (Table 1 and Chart 8). In 
particular, for the euro area pool the mean weekly number of hours worked by government 
employees (NACE proxy OPQ) increased from 34.9 in 2007 to 35.6 in 2012 (the median being 
36 to 38), while it rose from 35.2 to 35.9 in countries subject to fi scal stress during the crisis, 
namely Greece Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Italy (the median being 36 to 37). In 
the latter group of countries, the mean number of hours worked per week in the private sector, 
on the contrary, decreased. Increases in hours per extant employee may have created some 
room for staff reductions, mainly of public employees with temporary contracts. In addition, 
increases in hours worked were implemented without an accompanying wage compensation. 
Thus, government wages per hour are not as infl exible as commonly believed when compared 
with the private sector10.
PUBLIC WAGE BILL MEASURES IN THE EURO AREA (EA) AND EU, 
NON-EA COUNTRIES
CHART 7
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10  In this regard see Kopelman and Rosen (2016).
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DISTRIBUTION OF HOURS WORKED PER WEEK IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
SECTORS 
(percentages of workers in each interval of hours)
CHART 8
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations on the basis of EU-SILC (Eurostat)
NOTE: Hours correspond to the number of hours usually worked per week in main job.
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2.4 The wage bill adjustment: temporary or permanent? 
Recent public employment and wage policies have been part of a response to the perceived 
fi scal sustainability risks that increased with the crisis. In adverse cyclical conditions the 
government budget constraint tightens, and as a consequence different fi scal instruments have 
to be adjusted. When cyclical conditions become normalised, the need for fi scal adjustment 
loosens and even a reversal to pre crisis conditions might be expected. Indeed, the historical 
experience with policies aimed at containing public wage growth shows that they might not end 
up being of a structural, permanent nature. On the contrary, catching up processes in good 
economic times tend to counteract the initial government wage bill reduction, either partly or 
completely. 
The most recent experience shows that a signifi cant portion of the public employment 
adjustment hinged on government workers with temporary contracts. Some insights can be 
drawn in this regard from EU SILC data, available for the period up to 2012. According to the 
broader NACE proxy to government employment (OPQ) (Chart 9), the adjustment of employment 
in government related activities between 2007 and 2012 depended to a signifi cant extent in net 
terms on workers with temporary contracts, while the number of employees with permanent 
contracts in NACE OPQ sectors increased over that period of time. In the NACE O sector 
(“Public Administration”) there was a reduction in both the number of permanent and temporary 
workers between 2007 and 2012, but the latter fell more in relative terms. Country-specifi c 
studies with alternative data sources confi rm this fi nding11.
STATISTICS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOURS WORKED PER WEEK (2007-2012) TABLE 1
SOURCE: Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC (Eurostat).
NOTE: Hours correspond to the number of hours usually worked per week in main job. In the column “Diff” we show the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis of a Wald test of equality of means in 2007 and 2012: *** denotes a p-value lower than 1%, ** a p-value lower than 5%, and * a p-value lower than 
10%, while a blank means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Mean Median Variance
2007 2012 Diff 2007 2012 2007 2012
Hours worked per week (EU-SILC survey)
Euro Area
NACE OPQ proxy to the government sector 34.9 35.6 *** 36.0 38.0 106.5 93.3
Rest of the economy (“private sector”) 38.0 38.1 40.0 40.0 118.7 97.3
Public Administration (NACE O) 37.4 38.0 *** 38.0 39.0 75.8 60.4
Rest of European Union
NACE OPQ proxy to the government sector 35.8 36.7 *** 39.0 40.0 117.0 112.3
Rest of the economy (“private sector”) 39.6 39.5 40.0 40.0 111.8 107.8
Public Administration (NACE O) 38.7 39.3 * 40.0 40.0 71.8 68.9
Euro area countries under ĺscal stress
NACE OPQ proxy to the government sector 35.2 35.9 *** 36.0 37.0 71.4 55.1
Rest of the economy (“private sector”) 39.9 38.4 *** 40.0 40.0 78.9 75.1
Public Administration (NACE O) 37.2 37.9 *** 37.0 38.0 47.3 34.8
11  See for instance Montesinos et al. (2015).
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Consolidation measures, as discussed above, have increased average hours worked by 
public employees and as a consequence may have reduced the need to revert to pre crisis staff 
levels (temporary hires). Nevertheless, it could be the case that the adjustment of employment 
witnessed recently ends up being of a transitory nature, as in previous episodes of economic 
hardship.
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR 
BY TYPE OF CONTRACT
(millions of persons) 
CHART 9
NOTE: Hours correspond to the number of hours usually worked per week in a main job.
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Another remark is that it is diffi cult to assess what is or should be the optimal level of 
public employment of a given country. In fact, the share of public employment vis a vis private 
employment varies signifi cantly both across countries and within countries over time (Table 2). 
Since the early 1980s a downward trend in the ratio of government to private employment is 
visible in a number of countries, particularly in those countries with a larger public labour force. 
Nevertheless, other countries followed the opposite trend, particularly those with lower starting 
levels. Against this background, though, the size of the contraction during the recent fi scal 
consolidation episode seems to be more signifi cant in countries in which public employment 
followed an upward trend vis-à-vis the private sector in the pre-crisis period. In those countries, 
private sector employment losses during the crisis were also more signifi cant, which contributed 
to the tightening of government resources.
2.5 The supporting role of fiscal structural policies
Beyond policy actions with a short-term (budgetary) impact (see Appendix III-A), a number of 
measures of a more structural nature have been implemented in recent years (see Appendix III-B). 
In particular, policy initiatives to streamline public administration are encouraging. In addition, 
some renewed discussion is taking place on policy actions that focus on the substitutability/
complementarity between the public and the private sector as regards public production of 
goods/services vs. public fi nancing of private provision.
MEDIUM-TERM TRENDS IN THE RATIO OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (Ng) TO TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
IN THE ECONOMY (N)  
TABLE 2
SOURCES: ESCB, EUROSTAT (ESA2010) and OECD Economic Outlook Database. Data sources are heterogeneous and as such the numbers in the table 
have to be taken as being only indicative of underlying individual country trends.
(percent)
Ratio of government employees to total employment: Ng/N Change in th ratio: (Ng/N)t – (Ng/N)t-i
1980 1999 2007 2014 1980-2007 2007-2014
Belgium 19% 18% 18% 18% -0.5% 0.0%
Germany 13% 12% 11% 11% -2.0% -0.7%
Ireland 20% 14% 15% 15% -5.0% 0.4%
Greece 13% 18% 19% 16% 5.3% -2.2%
Spain 8% 14% 12% 14% 3.4% 1.9%
France 18% 22% 21% 21% 3.0% -0.2%
Italy 13% 16% 14% 14% 1.0% -0.7%
Luxembourg (1985) 16% 16% 18% 19% 1.8% 1.0%
The Netherlands 20% 15% 14% 14% -5.9% -0.1%
Austria 16% 16% 16% 16% 0.5% -0.7%
Portugal 9% 14% 14% 14% 5.6% 0.1%
Finland 16% 25% 25% 25% 8.8% 0.8%
Denmark 27% 29% 29% 30% 1.9% 1.5%
UK 27% 19% 19% 17% -8.0% -2.5%
Sweden 32% 31% 30% 28% -1.9% -1.8%
United States 16% 15% 15% 15% -1.3% -0.3%
Japan 9% 8% 8% 8% -0.4% -0.5%
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The literature claims that sustained reductions in the public wage bill are more likely 
to be achieved by countries that simultaneously adopt a wide range of structural public sector 
reforms and/or discretionary wage bill reduction measures. In addition, social dialogue between 
governments and labour market partners is also highlighted as a contributing factor (IMF, 2015; 
Forni and Novta, 2014). In previous episodes of public employment reform, measures of this kind 
were associated with a more contained evolution of the government wage bill following a crisis 
episode, as the budgetary savings were kept over time. One may also claim that savings were 
related to the increased effi ciency of the government sector induced by the structural measures. 
As regards public wages, policies of a more structural nature include human management/pay 
reforms, such as tightening the link between pay and performance, or changes in wage bargaining 
mechanisms within the government sector. A few measures along these lines have been put in 
place recently, in some cases in the framework of ongoing “public spending reviews”. A group 
of measures are aimed at streamlining the size, structure and scope of government, such as 
the elimination of redundancies among levels of government, the simplifi cation of procedures 
or reorganisation of services, and the consideration of alternatives to the public production of 
goods/services, including the introduction of schemes to publically fi nance private provision.
Based on the micro data evidence supporting this paper, a positive conditional public 
private wage gap emerges as a structural characteristic of many EU countries (see Appendix II). 
In this respect, some policy proposals have been recently put forward to reduce the wage 
gap. Several theoretical papers (see for example Economides, Philioppopoulos and Varthalitis, 
2015a; Gomes, 2014) show that establishing parity between working conditions in the public 
and the private sectors can be welfare improving under certain conditions. In particular, specifi c 
policies may be aimed at introducing more job fl exibility in the public sector, or explicitly linking 
public wage setting to the productivity of the market economy. Other authors (see, for instance, 
Ujhelyi, 2014) inspect the benefi ts of civil service rules, exploring the conditions under which the 
existence of tenured “bureaucrats” raises or decreases overall economy welfare. Nonetheless, all 
these proposals tend to be put forward in abstract terms, i.e. they do not take into consideration 
the country specifi c heterogeneity observable in the data that is at the root of differences across 
countries.
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3 The macroeconomic effects of public wage bill reform
This section is aimed at providing some evidence on the possible positive medium to longer- 
term benefi ts to the economy of using public wages and employment as fi scal consolidation 
instruments, when compared with other fi scal instruments. We look at these issues taking as 
given that a certain amount of fi scal consolidation had to be delivered to counteract a situation of 
fi scal stress. Contrary to other fi scal instruments, public employment and wages’ policies induce 
spillovers on private sector employment and wages through labour market dynamics. While the 
focus of this section is on the euro area as a whole, country-specifi c facts are also provided, 
where possible, based on comprehensive macro and micro datasets.
3.1 An overview 
The macroeconomic effect of public wage bill restraint is the outcome of a trade off between direct 
(negative) demand effects and indirect (positive) effects that occur through the labour market. 
A seminal work Alesina et al. (2002) found that reducing public wage expenditure generates 
reductions in private wages per employee, which improves competitiveness, increasing profi ts, 
investment, and economic growth. Along similar lines, Bermperoglou et al. (2013) found that 
cuts in government vacancies generate large output losses (direct effects dominate), while wage 
cuts have, if anything, insignifi cant expansionary effects (indirect effects dominate). See also 
Lamo, Moral Benito and Pérez (2016) along the same lines. 
These channels are illustrated in Table 3, where some quantitative insights are shown 
on the basis of the ESCB macro econometric models of Lithuania (Celov, 2015) and Spain 
(Hurtado et al., 2014). In the two models, public employment is exogenous, but public wages 
infl uence private sector wages. In both models, in response to a cut in public wages (by 1% of 
GDP) private consumption and wages fall, while investment and net exports increase. The direct 
adverse GDP effect is thus mitigated by the increased competitiveness of the economy. Under a 
public employment shock, the impact on wages is much lower, as it only relates to the increase 
in economic slack, measured by the unemployment rate-thus the GDP costs are larger.
The possible mechanisms operating to offset the negative short-term macroeconomic 
impact are explored. A key argument is that public wage restraint may set in motion a labour 
market adjustment through the inter-linkages with private wages. This is particularly important 
when public wage policy infl uences private sector-wage setting decisions (e.g. “leadership” or 
“signalling” role of government wages).
The literature has found robust evidence of signifi cant interrelations between public 
and private sector wages per employee. A wealth of recent empirical papers provides evidence 
of a direct causal relationship between these variables (Holm-Hadulla et al., 2010; Pérez and 
Sánchez, 2011; Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht, 2012). While private wages tend to lead public 
wages in the long run, for some countries b-directional causality (i.e. running from public 
to private wages and vice versa) is found. The main theoretical reference is the well-known 
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Scandinavian model of infl ation. With this, especially in the case of fi xed exchange rates, there 
is an obvious case for the traded goods sector being the “wage leader”, i.e. wage leadership 
is exerted by the sector more open to competition (Lindquist and Vilhelmsson, 2006). Cross 
country differences exist in public wage spillovers due to differences in domestic labour and 
product market institutions. The probability of public wages leading private sector wages is 
stronger in countries where wage bargaining centralisation and coordination is high and in which 
there are high levels of union membership, while it is weaker the greater the openness to trade 
and the presence of wage indexation (Lamo, Pérez, and Sánchez Fuentes, 2013)12.
Section 3.2 describes how the recent consolidation period has contributed to some 
competitiveness gains in the euro area, in view of the evidence provided on the partial correction 
of the public private wage premium. On the other hand, section 3.3 discusses some evidence 
on the effi ciency gains in the labour market dynamics, based on the complementarity of public 
private goods and their relative wage compression. It must be noted that the implementation 
of fi scal structural reforms explained in section 2.5 is also aimed at increasing effi ciency in the 
public sector.
3.2 The competitiveness channel
The facts are that EU countries that were subject to substantial fi scal stress during the crisis 
were among the ones that cumulated larger competitiveness losses in the pre crisis period 
(Chart 10). At the same time, though, these countries have corrected part of their imbalances 
since the beginning of the crisis. The evolution of public wages may have played a role in this 
correction. 
12  In turn, wage setting institutions and practices in the public sector vary considerably across EU countries in several 
respects, including in particular the role of collective bargaining versus government legislative decision, the degree of 
centralisation of collective bargaining, or union density, See EC (2014) for an in depth comparative analysis of labour 
market institutions and practices of EU governments. See also Giordano et al. (2015).
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT SHOCKS IN TWO MACRO-ECONOMIC MODELS 
(FOR LITHUANIA AND SPAIN)  
TABLE 3
SOURCES:  Author’s calculations based on Celov (2015) and Hurtado et al. (2014).
Country: Spain Lithuania
Shock (-1% of GDP): Public wage shock Public employment shock Public wage shock Public employment shock
Year 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Percentage deviations from steady-state
GDP -0.09 -0.18 -0.23 -1.11 -1.17 -1.24 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.04 -0.07
Private consumption -0.28 -0.62 -0.85 -0.19 -0.35 -0.51 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.31
Investment 0.28 0.38 0.39 0.04 0.13 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.08
HICP -0.09 -0.20 -0.27 -0.22 -0.34 -0.38 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Wages -2.80 -3.15 -3.35 -0.31 -0.48 -0.57 -0.26 -0.27 -0.29 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09
Employment -0.08 -0.22 -0.34 -1.77 -1.88 -1.97 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.25 -0.24 -0.22
Exports 0.09 0.19 0.24 0.04 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.014 0.02 0.15 0.17 0.18
Imports -0.19 -0.38 -0.46 -0.19 -0.25 -0.34 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02
Net exports (% of GDP) 0.09 0.21 0.27 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.12
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) 0.45 0.33 0.25 0.50 0.46 0.43 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.13
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First, more relaxed wage conditions in the general government sector have a direct 
impact on overall economy competitiveness given its signifi cant share in the total. Overall, the 
restraint in public wages directly reduced unit labour cost (ULC) growth in the euro area during 
the 2010-2014 period (Chart 11). The contribution to ULC growth from compensation per public 
sector employee was limited to -0.1 percentage point per annum over 2010- 2014, which 
contrasts with the positive contribution from compensation per private sector employee (1.8 p.p. 
on average per annum for the same period). The contribution from productivity has been erratic 
over the reference period, but this factor has helped to improve overall cost competitiveness 
(around 0.3 p.p. on average per annum).
Beyond this direct impact, there could be other mechanisms at work. Given the 
aforementioned potential leadership role of public wages in some countries13, there could also 
EVOLUTION OF NOMINAL UNIT COSTS IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES  CHART 10
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on AMECO: ratio of compensation per employee to real GDP per person 
employed.
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13  The probability of public wages leading private sector wages is higher in countries where wage bargaining centralisation 
and coordination is high and where there are high levels of union membership, while it is weaker when there is greater 
openness to trade or wage indexation (Lamo, Pérez, and Sánchez-Fuentes, 2013).
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be an indirect effect from public wages on ULC by setting in motion benefi cial labour market 
dynamics. It is diffi cult to assess, however, to what extent private wage developments in recent 
years may have been infl uenced by those in the general government sector.
The existence of distortions in public private wage gaps (see Appendix II for a 
detailed explanation and quantifi cation) can be particularly harmful for competitiveness given 
that public sector activities are concentrated in non tradable sectors, which are less exposed 
to international competition. The wage gap is estimated to rise after controlling for workers’ 
characteristics and stems mainly from differences between workers’ wages at the low end of the 
wage distribution. As an example, for the euro area and the group of non-euro area countries 
shown, the wage premium is estimated to be positive for workers in the lower 10% quantile of 
the wage distribution, and turns negative in the top 10% (90% quantile) (Chart 12).
There is evidence that the recent public wage restraint has driven the partial correction 
of the existing positive public-private wage premium in the euro area. Macro (aggregate) data 
illustrated in Chart 2 (last panel) show a relative decline of 2 p.p. of the ratio of public-to-private 
wages per employee for the euro area (from 25% in 2009 to 23% in 2013). This reversed the 
upward trend in the wage gap since the second half of the 1990s14. Micro data analysis also 
supports this favourable trend, as the estimated (unexplained) wage gap has been recently 
UNIT LABOUR COSTS AND REAL PUBLIC WAGES   CHART 11
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations from AMECO and ESCB databases. Countries included in the left panel are the 
EU-28 excluding Bulgaria.
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14  Since the start of EMU, certain peripheral countries experienced high and volatile public wage growth, coupled with 
positive public-private wage gaps, and rapid increases in unit labour costs, facts that have been linked by some 
authors to the overall economy loss of competitiveness witnessed in the pre-crisis period (see e.g. Holm-Hadulla et 
al., 2010; Fernández de Córdoba, Pérez and Torres, 2012a; García-Rodríguez, 2015; or Kollintzas, Papageorgiou, and 
Vassilatos, 2015; Campos et al, 2015).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1607
reduced. For the euro area as a whole, the estimated conditional wage gap for the 2008 2012 
period for the broader NACE proxy of government related activities is 40% lower than the one 
estimated for the 2004-2007 period. In turn, for 2012 the gap was 55% lower than the one 
estimated for 2007 (see Chart 12 above, and Campos et al., 2015).
The reduction of the (unexplained) wage gap has been, however, uneven over the wage 
distribution and across different types of workers. For the euro area pool and the group of non 
euro area EU countries the wage premium dropped more signifi cantly at the upper end of the 
wage distribution between 2007 and 2012 (Chart 12, Panel B, differences between bars and 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR PAY GAP IN THE EU   CHART 12
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dots in both panels)15. In fact, most of the countries have smaller or negative public private 
wage differentials in quantile 90 of the income distribution, than at the lower end of the wage 
distribution (quantile 10).
The dynamics of the gap during the crisis refl ect the different behaviour of wages and 
hours worked in the public and the private sectors. Wages per hour worked grew much faster 
in the private than in the government sector over 2007-2012 for the pools of euro area and 
non-euro area EU countries. On the individual country level, wage per hour growth was higher in 
the private sector in 15 out of the 23 individual EU countries studied, refl ecting the generalised 
implementation of cost containment policies in the public sector over that period, most notably 
since 2010. In particular, there was an increase in hours worked in a typical week for employees 
in government related activities (particularly in countries under fi scal stress). Data for the private 
sector indicate an opposite trend.
The sectorial structure of the country, between tradable goods and services and non-
tradable sectors, may also be instrumental to understanding the public pay gap (Chart 13). 
Indeed, compared to the baseline estimated wage premium, the “Scandinavian model” seems to 
operate partially, as public private wage gaps are reduced when public wages are compared 
to wages in the tradable sectors, instead of those in the overall private sector delimitation used 
before (all sectors except OPQ). In particular, the premiums of Belgium, Germany, and the UK 
turn negative, while that of France becomes more negative. In general premiums with respect to 
the tradable sector are lower, even though there are exceptions.
3.3 The efficiency channel 
The assessment of the effi ciency of labour market fl ows provided here is based on two concepts: 
the complementarity between public and private employment, and the wage dispersion in the 
public vis à vis the private sector.
The size and strength of the impact of reductions in public employment mainly depends 
on the degree of complementarity between the public and private sectors. Government activity 
complements private sector activity through the provision of collective goods/services (like the 
judicial system), while at the same time partially competes with (substitutes) the private sector in 
a number of sectors (like education or health). A decrease in public jobs in sectors that produce 
highly substitutable products can directly spur private jobs. However, in sectors in which public 
and private production complement each other, there exists the possibility that a reduction in 
public employment negatively affects private sector employment, if public production positively 
affects the marginal product of labour in the private sector (see Maley and Moutos, 1996; Algan 
et al., 2002).
15  In the former case, the lower 10% premium moved from 0.19 in 2007 to 0.14 in 2012, while in the upper 10% the wage 
premium decreased from 0.00 to  -0.03. For a number of countries, though, the change by quantiles went in opposite 
directions, refl ecting in some cases policy measures aimed at reducing wage differentials within the government sector 
or targeting certain groups of public workers. However, at the upper end of the wage distribution, the literature shows 
that the premium may refl ect more the impact of characteristics whereas at the lower end it refl ects unobserved 
characteristics.
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THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR PAY GAP: TRADABLE VERSUS NON-TRADABLE 
SECTORS    
CHART 13
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on National Accounts data (macro data) and EU-SILC database (micro 
data). Countries included are the euro area pool (EA), all EU-28 countries with the exception of MT, FI, BG, PL, RO, 
and HR, plus Norway and Iceland (in this case 2011 instead of 2012 estimates). For the computation of micro-based 
gaps we referred to Campos et al. (2015). 
Panel A. The gap between the “public sector” and the “tradable sectors”
Panel B. The gap between the “public sector” and the “private non-tradable sectors”
Panel C. The gap between the “private non-tradable  sectors” and the “tradable sectors”
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The empirical literature tends to fi nd that public employment crowd-out private sector 
employment. An increase in vacancies in the public sector causes labour fl ows from the private 
to the public sector if a positive public-private wage gap exists. This leads to an increase in 
private sector wages and a potential reduction of private sector employment (Stepanyan and 
Leigh, 2015). The dependence on the degree of public private substitutability is exemplifi ed by 
means of simulations of a smal-scaled DSGE model for the euro area (Chart 14). The model 
encompasses a positive public-private wage gap and an aggregate production function in which 
output is produced by combining public and private employment. The elasticity of substitution 
between public and private employment modulates the degree of complementarity in production 
of the two inputs. The shock consists of an increase in the public sector wage bill implemented 
through an increase in public wages and in public employment by about the same proportion. 
This increase in the public wage bill is self-fi nanced by an increase in the income tax rate16.
A second factor in determining the economic incentives inducing people to enter or 
leave a sector, is the relative wage dispersion, i.e. the shape of the wage structure. It has been 
argued that the public sector fi nds it more diffi cult to attract and retain highly skilled workers 
as a result of a relatively higher wage compression (see e.g. the seminal work of Borjas, 1993). 
RESPONSE TO A PUBLIC WAGE BILL (POSITIVE) SHOCK IN A SMALL-SCALE DSGE 
MODEL CALIBRATED FOR THE EURO AREA    
(percentage deviations from steady state values)
CHART 14
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on Fernández-de-Córdoba et al. (2012). 
Lines differ in the degree of the elasticity of substitution between public and private 
employment. Dashed line: 1.1 (baseline calibration); Solid line: 1.7; Dotted line: 5.
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16  The relative strength of the channels outlined above depends on the degree of economic slack (see, e.g. Michaillat, 
2014, for a theoretical model, and Lamo et al., 2016, for empirical results).
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In the case of the euro area pool, according to EU-SILC data, the distribution of 
public wages became more compressed between 2007 and 2012 (the coeffi cient of variation 
of log hourly wages decreased by 6% for the broad defi nition of government related sector). 
Nevertheless, in relative terms, the ratio of the coeffi cient of variation of log hourly wages in 
the public and the private sectors increased from 0.85 in 2007 to 0.88 in 2012 for the euro 
area pool, and from 0.76 to 0.81 for the pool of non-euro area EU countries. At the same time, 
though, relative wage compression increased in the 2010-2012 period for the euro area pool 
(and in 15 out of the 17 countries analysed), broadly due to increased wage compression in the 
public sector. The opposite happened in the group of non-euro area EU countries. Discretionary 
policies implemented during the recent fi scal consolidation process may be at the root of this 
increase in public wage compression.
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4 Policy discussion
Well designed government wages and employment policies and reforms may generate 
overall economy competitiveness gains and increase the effi ciency of the labour market. In 
times of fi scal stress, public employment adjustments can affect GDP and total economy 
employment positively if there are large ineffi ciencies in the government sector and/or there is 
high substitutability between private and public sector output. Public wage policies can have 
benefi cial effects on competitiveness if they are targeted to infl uence overall economy wage 
moderation (via “wage leadership”). In addition, if a public pay gap exists, the latter positive effect 
of public wage restraint becomes amplifi ed as labour market ineffi ciencies are also reduced, 
provided policies are correctly designed.
While public sector demand across the euro area is needed in the current circumstances 
to support economic growth, in some countries fi scal consolidation needs are still high, and 
recent government wage bill savings are to be preserved. When cyclical conditions become 
normalised, the need for fi scal prudence loosens, not least given that public employment and 
wages tend to follow lagged pro cyclical patterns, as pointed out by the available literature (see 
e.g. Lamo, Pérez, and Schuknecht, 2013a).
As regards public wage containment, historical experience shows that catching-up 
processes in good economic times tend to partially or completely cancel out crisis-related 
budgetary savings. As regards public employment, analysis based on micro data shows that, 
in many countries, a signifi cant portion of the reduction depended on workers with temporary 
contracts. Thus, the employment adjustment was more of a cyclical-like reaction than a 
permanent reduction. Additional margins of short-term adjustment include the moderation of 
high public-to-private wages ratios (the “wage gap”).
Moreover, many countries have recently embarked on fi sca-structural reforms, geared 
towards increasing effi ciency in the public sector, which in turn are likely to support the public 
wage moderation achieved and help to counteract the risks of policy reversal.
Overall, further adjustment of the government wage bill has to be designed carefully 
and with regard to country specifi c circumstances. Margins for possible further public wage and 
employment retrenchment have to take into account the particular country-related conditions. 
This includes the consolidation effort and structural reforms already accomplished, and the 
effi cient provision of public goods and services, including the preservation of a high level of 
human capital.
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Appendix I
Definitions and data used
In advanced OECD economies, the government is widely involved in the provision of welfare 
services (mainly health and education) and utilities. This means that its presence in the economy 
goes well beyond the provision of pure public goods and services. The specifi c form of the provision 
of welfare services varies signifi cantly across countries, i.e. whether it consists of direct service 
delivery, partial delivery and/or partial/full subsidisation of consumption. These alternatives imply a 
different role for non governmental organisations, and thus translate into signifi cant heterogeneity 
across countries in the number of public sector employees in those sectors.
DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR: SPAIN AND DENMARK    
SOURCES: Danmarks Statistik.
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SOURCES: Labour force Survey (INE).
For a cross country study, it is important to acknowledge upfront that it is very diffi cult 
to delineate the precise nature of the public sector. For example, according to Eurofound (2015) 
services in the health systems in Germany, France and the Benelux countries, while largely state- 
funded, are provided mainly by private sector companies or mixed-ownership organisations. 
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The heterogeneity in the direct involvement of the public sector in the different sectors of 
the economy might be illustrated by considering the distribution of employees in the general 
government, public enterprises and the private sector (for the cases of Denmark and Spain and, 
to some extent, France). In Denmark the number of general government employees in the health 
and education sectors is close to 90% and more than 80%, respectively. In contrast, in Spain 
the percentages are about 50% and 60%, respectively. In addition, the involvement of the public 
sector (directly or via public enterprises) in the transportation and storage and utilities sectors 
is quite different between the two countries. It is worth mentioning that the selection of just a 
few countries is not only for the sake of brevity, but mainly due to diffi culties in fi nding publicly 
available, cross-country homogeneous datasets on which to base a broader analysis.
In this regard, in order to analyse the activity of the government as an employer, it 
is necessary to make use of different partial data sources, as no single source guarantees 
comprehensive coverage of the total number of public employees in terms of institutional sector 
coverage, characteristics (including wages), and homogeneity of defi nitions. 
As regards macro (aggregate) data, the focus is on the general government sector 
(S.13) as defi ned in National Accounts (ESA2010) for all current EU Member States (EU 28, 
where possible). The primary source of government wage bill data and all macroeconomic 
variables used through the study (GDP, prices, total economy wages and employment, 
population) is Eurostat for European Union (EU) countries and the OECD (Economic Outlook 
Database) for non-EU countries. General government employment data, in turn, have been 
provided by the Eurosystem National Central Banks, even though in a majority of cases the 
primary data source is Eurostat. For non EU countries, OECD data is used. The pre-1995 series 
of euro area aggregates is taken from the ECB’s Area Wide Model Database (see Fagan, Henry 
and Mestre, 2005); the fi scal block of this database is taken from Paredes, Pedregal and Pérez 
(2014). While the choice of macro data sources and defi nitions ensures the best available degree 
of harmonisation and comparability, there are however measurement problems both within and 
across countries. Differences/changes in working hours, privatisation, differences/changes in 
the size of the public sector over time, or changes in the skill composition of the labour force 
over time might distort the view on certain issues.
The measure of aggregate wages chosen for the analysis is compensation per employee 
in nominal terms (instead of wages), owing to data limitations in terms of sample size and coverage 
of countries in the sample. Compensation per employee is computed using compensation of 
employees and employment data. Compensation of private sector employees is defi ned as 
total economy compensation of employees minus compensation of government employees. 
Compensation per private employee is defi ned as private compensation of employees divided 
by private sector employment minus government employment minus self-employment. 
OECD and Eurostat data on the Classifi cation of the Functions of Government (COFOG) 
is also used. This makes it possible to analyse the general government sector wage bill expenditure 
broken down into individual and collective goods and services. Individual services (“merit goods”, 
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see e.g. Fiorito and Kollintzas, 2004), are characterised by the fact that they can also be provided 
privately, such as health, education and other services, while collective goods (traditional “public 
goods”) are non-rival substitutes for private consumption. In particular, we proxy individual 
services by aggregating the functions of health, education and social protection, and collective 
services by aggregating the remaining seven COFOG categories, namely general services, 
defence, public order and safety, economic affairs, environment, housing, and recreation.
As regards sources of micro data, the selected database is the European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC) survey, given its cross country comparability, data 
availability for the pre-  and post-crisis periods, and the fact that it covers most European Union 
countries (all with the exception of Finland, Malta, Bulgaria and Croatia), as well as Norway 
and Iceland. The distinction between public and private sector employment is based on NACE 
(Statistical Classifi cation of Economic Activities), Rev.2. The most recent data refers to the 2013 
EU SILC wave, which includes employment and earnings information pertaining to 2012. In this 
framework, as it is standard in the literature, the “government sector” will be an approximation 
based on either the  aggregation of the O (Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory 
Social Security), P (Education) and Q (Health and social work) sectors of the NACE classifi cation 
(broad defi nition), or only the O sector (restricted defi nition). With the EU-SILC database it is not 
possible to separate public employees from private sector employees in any of the sectors. This 
means that to construct the proxy, all the employees in these sectors are assigned to the “public 
sector”. This might be particularly relevant for activities P and Q, where private sector providers 
are more prevalent. In the case of EU-SILC data the defi nition of “wages per employee” is 
computed based on the individual gross monthly earnings (including only monetary earnings 
and excluding fi nancial income from investments, assets, savings, stocks and shares) before 
netting out taxes and social contributions, and the number of hours worked per week in the 
main job. It must be stressed that in this study data limitations prevent us to control for a number 
of factors: fringe benefi ts, pension rights, job security. Finally, the data selected do not allow to 
control for the same selection bias due to the possibility that the sorting of employees among 
sectors is not random, but occurs on the basis of unobserved characteristics.
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Appendix II
Deepening the understanding of public private pay differentials
In advanced OECD economies the government is widely involved in the provision of welfare 
services (mainly health and education) and utilities, i.e. its presence in the economy goes well 
beyond the provision of traditional public goods and services. The specifi c form of the provision 
of the former varies signifi cantly across countries, in particular as regards the type of provision, 
i.e. whether it consist of direct service delivery, partial delivery and/or partial/full subsidisation 
of consumption. These alternatives involve a different role for non governmental organisations, 
and thus translate into signifi cant heterogeneity across countries in the number of public sector 
employees in those sectors. 
A number of reasons for the existence of public private wage differentials have been 
advanced in the literature on the subject. For example, starting from the observation that wage 
premiums tend to be higher in countries with a lower share of government employment as a 
proportion of total employment in the economy, some authors develop models in which a smaller 
group of public employees derive monopoly power from a tighter control of the production 
of public goods/services (see e.g. Fernández-de-Córdoba, Pérez and Torres, 2012a; EC, 
2014; Kollintzas, Papageorgiou, and Vassilatos, 2015). On related grounds, it is argued that 
a wage premium arises because of differences in the bargaining power of private and public 
sector workers (Holmlund, 1997). Other explanations are linked to countries’ degree of fi scal 
decentralisation. In this regard it has been argued that public expenditure decentralisation tends 
to be related to the presence of higher overall public wage premiums, because of common 
pool problems (in the case of highly decentralised countries) and when government wages 
are set in a homogeneous way in the country (in the case of more centralised countries). In 
addition, some recent evidence signals that the public-private wage premium may be related 
to employment protection legislation, possibly because higher compensations are needed to 
make public employment attractive when private employment is more strongly protected (see 
EC, 2014). More fundamentally, the heterogeneity of the premium may also be linked to the 
degree of substitutability between publicly provided goods and services and private activity. 
Simple correlation analysis shows that the higher the degree of substitutability, the lower the 
wage premium. 
Despite the rich set of theories rationalising the existence of a public pay premium, 
there is a limited amount of research providing cross country comparisons of public-private pay 
differentials, see e.g. Giordano et al. (2015) or de Castro et al. (2013). An exception is Campos et 
al. (2015), who provide a structured and comprehensive analysis of the factors outlined above, 
and analyse the changes in the gap during the fi nancial crisis and in the long-run.
This paper estimates for a set of 25 (mostly) EU countries for 2004-2012 the part of the 
wage gap that remains unexplained once (observable) individual characteristics are controlled 
for. Unfortunately, the data available are not enough to provide a full understanding of the 
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mechanism of sorting between the public and private sector on the basis of factors such as 
fringe benefi ts, job security or pension schemes. Moreover, it is also not possible to control for 
self selection effects determined by the unobservable characteristics of the individuals (such as 
preferences).  Despite these drawbacks, the analysis of EU SILC data allows the identifi cation of 
several relevant differences between public and private sector workers. They follow the common 
approach of running Mincer type wage regressions taking the logarithm of gross income per 
hour as the dependent variable, (y). The set of covariates (X) includes binary variables denoting 
married status, low and high education, managerial position, part time job and female, year and 
region related effects, as well as experience and a second degree polynomial in experience (or 
age and age squared whenever information on experience is not available). The specifi cation 
also includes a binary variable (public) denoting that individual i works in one of the industries 
taken as a proxy for the public sector (Public Administration, health and education). Equation (1) 
clarifi es the specifi cation.
y i =  + X i´  + Public i  +  i (I.1)
Thus, as per the usual approach, the coeffi cient associated with the category of public 
worker () represents the earnings differential (evaluated at the mean of the distribution) that 
remains once the other relevant determinants are controlled for and, if estimated to be positive, 
it is labelled public private wage differential/premium/gap (or wage penalty if negative). 
Campos et al. (2015) document large cross country differences in the estimated public- 
private wage premium (from -13.5% in Norway to 39% in Cyprus). They also fi nd that that 
more than half of the cross sectional variation in wage gaps can be accounted for by variables 
linked to non-competitive wage settlements in the public sector, whereas different labour 
market institutions in the public vs. the private sector have less explanatory power. By looking 
at long-term trends (1970 2014) using national accounts data, they also fi nd that openness 
to international competition and improvements in the institutional quality of governments have 
been associated with decreases in the public-private wage gap. 
With regard to the fi nancial crisis, a signifi cant narrowing of wage gaps has been 
documented across European countries, this process being mainly associated with the 
widespread fi scal consolidation needs, rather than structural factors such as those explaining 
the pay gap differences in the cross section.
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Appendix IIIa
Policy measures implemented during the crisis with a direct impact on the general 
government sector wage bill
Year Wage measure Staff measure Reasons Other comments
Euro area countries
AT 1996–1997 wage freeze ĺscal consolidation
1998–2000 wage increase (above past inĻation) partial compensation for losses 
incurred in 1996/97
2002 wage increase (below past inĻation) ĺscal consolidation
2013 wage freeze ĺscal consolidation
BE 1982–1986 freeze in wage indexation; wage freeze ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ
1984–1986 employment freeze (partial) ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ
1992 wage increase
1994 wage indexation (new regulations) ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ health index
1994 abrogation of compulsory military 
service
2012–2013 freeze in wage indexation;  wage freeze federal budget control march 
2012,  federal budget 2013
CY 2009 employment increase
2010 employment cut
2011–2012 wage cut; wage freeze
2013–2014 wage cut; wage freeze; other savings
DE During 1990s employment cut (local gov. and
east german states)
XQLĺFDWLRQRIJHUPDQ\
1990–2010 wage increase (stepwise adjustment of 
wages in east german states to west 
german levels)
XQLĺFDWLRQRIJHUPDQ\
1990–2009 increase in working hours (without wage 
adjustment)
ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ reverse in recent years 
2009–2010 employment increase (special 
case) 
SDUWRIĺVFDOSDFNDJHLQHFRQRPLF
DQGĺQDQFLDOFULVLV
additional temporary staff for 
employment agency
EE 2008–2010 wage cut; wage freeze employment cut; employment 
freeze
ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ budgets, supplementary budgets
2011–2012 wage freeze employment freeze ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ budgets, supplementary budgets
ES 1993–1994 wage freeze hiring freeze (with few 
exceptions)
ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ
1995–1996 replacement rate ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQSXEOLFVHFWRU
downsizing
1997 wage freeze ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ
1997–2001 limits to the replacement rate 
(with some exceptions)
ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQSXEOLFVHFWRU
downsizing
2007–2009 wage increase (certain groups) budget laws 
2009–2014 limits to replacement rate ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ budget laws
2010 wage cut ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ royal decree-law 8/2010
2011–2014 wage freeze ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ budget laws
2012 changes to compensationduring 
temporary incapacity and union licenses; 
increase in working hours ĺVFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ royal decree-laws 20/2012, 
20/2011
one-off elimination of one extra payment
(december)
2012–2014 wage cut (regional level) hiring freeze ĺscal consolidation budget laws
2015 one-off partial cash devolution of 2012 
extra payment
budget laws
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FI 1992–1994 possibility to replace monetary holiday 
bonuses for additional vacation 
employment cut (local 
government) 
ĺscal consolidation and cuts in 
central government transfers to local 
government
1992–1993 wage freeze in accordance to collective 
agreements
1994 increase in working hours ĺscal consolidation
FR 1996 freeze in wage indexation
2003 freeze in wage indexation
2007–2012 replacement rate government modernisation, 
reduction of spending
2011–2014 freeze in wage indexation ĺscal consolidation
GR 1978–1980 employment freeze ĺscal consolidation since may 1978
1982 wage increase (certain groups); wage 
indexation 
Income redistribution Introduction of ATA (ex post 
automatic wage indexation) 
1983 partial deference of wage indexation; 
wage freeze
effort to check the increase in ULC law 1320/1983; ATA
1984–1985 wage indexation ATA 
1986–1987 wage freeze; (revision of) wage 
indexation (rules)
balance of payments crisis revision of ATA (from ex post to ex 
ante wage indexation); Laws 
1584,1589, 1986 
1988–1989 wage increase; (revision of) wage 
indexation (rules)
revision of ATA, law 1836/1989
1990 deduction in wage increase; (revision of) 
wage indexation (rules)
ĺscal consolidation laws 1874/1990, 1884/1990
1991 wage increase; (revision of) wage 
indexation (rules)
ATA abolishment 
Year wage measure staff measure reasons other comments
GR 1992 wage freeze (with some exceptions) laws 2025/1992, 2019/1992
1993–1994 wage increase; wage indexation laws 2129/1993, 2198/1994
1995–1999 wage increase; wage indexation restrictions on hiring convergence program 1994–1999 laws 2297/1995, 2399/1996,  
2470/1997, 2606/1998, 
2448/1996, 2521/1997, 
2530/1997,    2469/1997, 
2702/1999; restrictions on hiring 
1998
2000–2007 wage increase laws 2768/1999,  2873/2000, 
3016/2002, 3156/2003, 
3205/2003, 3356/2005, 3356/2005
2008–2009 wage increase (certain groups), wage 
freeze
2010–2014 wage cut; other measures; wage 
increase (certain groups)
employment cut; restrictions on 
hiring
Laws 3812/2009; 3833/2010, 
3845/2010( (MoU/2.2011),  
4002/2011, MTFS, budgets , 
others
IR 1988–2000 wage increase 1988–1990 program for national 
recovery
1991–1993 program for economic 
and social progress
1994–1996 program for economic 
and social progress
1997–2000 partnership 2000
2001–2006 wage increase 2001–2003 program for prosperity 
and fairness 
2004–2006 sustaining progress
2009–2011 wage cut supplementary budget 2009; 
budget 2010, budget 2011
2012–2014 wage cut budget 2012, MTFS/Ec ĺscal 
Outlook; Croke Park II Haddington 
Rd,  MTFS
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IT 2001–2003 pension (two) reforms tax harmonization
2002 wage increase
2004–2006 wage increase process started in 2004
2006–2007 wage increase process for 2006/2007
2008–2009 wage increase process for 2008/2009
2010–2012 wage freeze (wage cut certain groups); 
stop renewal of contracts
stop turn over ĺscal consolidation process for 2010–2012
law 78/2010
2013–2014 wage freeze (wage cut certain groups); 
stop renewal of contracts
ĺscal consolidation extension of provisions of 2010 to 
2014
LU 1986–1987 wage increase 
1990 wage increase 
1995–2006 wage increase 
2007 wage increase
2009 wage increase
2010 wage increase (certain groups)
2011 employment freeze
LT 1994–2014 increase in minimum wages
2010 wage reduction economic and ĺnancial crisis
2013–2014 wage increase partially due to  constitutional 
court decision 
LV 2007–2009 increase in minimum wages
2009–2010 wage cut
PT 2002 replacement rate ĺscal consolidation
2003 wage freeze (automatic career 
progressions and reclassiĺcations) 
ĺscal consolidation
2003–2004 wage freeze ĺscal consolidation
2006 wage freeze (automatic career 
progressions and reclassiĺcations) 
replacement rate ĺscal consolidation Staff measures: under the scope 
of prace: central government 
restructuring programme
2007 wage freeze
2011-2014 wage cut
2013 hours worked adjustment
SI 1995–2000 wage increase (below past inĻation) macroeconomic stability 
2000–2001 wage increase (certain groups)
2001–2002 wage increase (below private sector 
wage increase) 
2004–2005 wage indexation (in accordance to 
inĻation; new regulations) 
Programme for effective 
Integration into the EU (July 
2003); planned implementation of 
the new payment system
2006–2008 wage increase (below past inĻation) 2006–2007 planned 
implementation of the new 
payment system; 2008–2009
introduction of the new payment 
system
2009–2011 wage increase (below past inĻation); 
wage freeze
ĺscal consolidation
2012 wage increase (below past inĻation); 
wage cut 
replacement rate new payment system, ĺscal 
consolidation
New payment system for wage 
adjustment 
2013–2014 wage cut ĺscal consolidation
SK 2001 – 2006 employment cut improving local accessibility and 
efĺciency of public administration
2011 wage cut employment cut ĺscal consolidation
2012 wage freeze fiscal consolidation
Year wage measure staff measure reasons Other comments
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Non–euro area countries
BG 2010 wage freeze (indexation) Employment cut
2011–2012 wage freeze (indexation); increase in 
minimum wages
2013–2014 increase in minimum wages
CZ 2008 wage growth reduction 2008 stabilization reform of public 
ĺnance
2009 wage increase 2009 stimulus package
2011 wage increase (certain groups) 2011 consolidation package
2010–2012 wage freeze 2010 austerity package
2011–2012 wage cut 2011 consolidation package
DK 1982 wage increase (automatic indexation) inĻation First suspended and later 
abolished permanently in 1986.
HR 1994 wage freeze
1998–1999 wage increase
2000–2001 wage decrease ĺscal consolidation
2003 employment cut ĺscal consolidation
2007–2012 wage increase Agreement of 2006
HR 2009–2010 wage cut fiscal consolidation
HU 2007–2008 control of wage growth employment cut
PL 2002–2003 wage freeze ĺscal consolidation
2006 wage increase (certain groups) wage pressure
2007 wage freeze reduction of social security 
contribution rate paid by employees
2007–2009 wage increase (certain groups) programme for years 2007-2009 
(modernisation of uniformed 
services)
2008–2012 wage increase (certain groups)
2010 wage freeze ĺscal consolidation
2011 wage cut (certain groups) ĺscal consolidation
2011–2014 wage freeze (certain groups) ĺscal consolidation
2013–2014 wage increase (certain groups)
RO 2009 wage cut
2012 wage freeze
2013 wage increase
2014 near–freeze in public wages
SOURCES: European System of Central Banks.
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Appendix IIIb
Significant structural policy actions with a direct impact on the general government 
sector wage bill implemented by EU countries
Country Measure Description
Historical episodes: 1980-2008
Belgium copernicus plan (1999-2004) new organizational structure, new management culture, new HRM policy
Germany federalism reform i (2006) devolution of legislation and remuneration for civil servants to individual state governments --> more 
efficient allocation of competences across gov. levels
Greece 1988; 1997; 2003-2004 1988: public sector employees governed by private-law contracts; establishment of an “unified pay 
scale” of the civil service
1997:new pay scale
2003-2004: extension of part-time employment opportunities (non-permanent) to the public sector
Ireland 1988-1990 introduction of social partnership
Italy privatisation of the public sector (1993) staff regulations in the public sector determined by a collective bargaining system (as in the private 
sector): augment labour mobility, including the right to lay off public employees.
introduction of performance-related pay
Portugal restructuring of state central administration 
programme (prace) (2005-2009)
aim: reorganise central government in order to cut costs and raise efficiency (restructuring of 
ministries and regionalised services) including : mobility regime, introduction of performance 
assessment mechanisms, the social protection reform, the new legal employment, career system and 
pay scales law (labour legislation closer the private sector)
Portugal 2006 increase in the minimal retirement age and years of service for public employees, as part of the 
convergence towards the general social security regime.
Slovenia 2001-2002; 2003 2001-2002: separate agreement for public and private sector (adjustment of wages in private and 
public sector could differ).
2003: the adjustment of the basic wage was replaced with a pension insurance premium; 
new payment system
United Kingdom new public management (1994, comprehensive 
spending review 2007)
outsourcing non-core functions, establishment of executive agencies 
performance pay (which links part of a public servant’s salary to his annual performance
Current episodes: 2008-2017
Cyprus public administration reform 2013 reforms of public administration to improve its functioning and cost-effectiveness improving the 
efĺciency of state-owned and semi-public enterprises, scaled wage cuts, streamlining of allowances, 
further horizontal wage cuts, income contribut ion to health care, reform of pension schemes.
Estonia new public service act (2012) 2013 new public remuneration system (drop of the central salary scales, reduction of wage components) 
2013: reclassiĺcation of a large transport service company in to the general government sector
France general review of public policies (RGPP) (2009-
2012) / spending reviews
replacement of only1/2 of retiring employees (2007-2012) / spending review on the general 
government secor and publicly-owned companies (ongoing since end-2014)
Greece public administration reform 2009-2013 reorganising local and central government 
tighter rules for temporary staff, cancellation of vacant job post and reallocation of qualiĺed staff to 
priority areas 
extension of working hours in the public sector 
rationalising the public remuneration system: the single payment authority (SPA)’s, which will allow for 
a more effective coverage, assessment and payment of employees/new wage grid
Ireland public administration reform 2009-2013 reorganising local and central government 
rationalising the public remuneration system 
introduction cross public sector measures, including greater use of shared services and information 
technology solutions, reform of public procurement processes, regular comprehensive expenditure 
reviews and using new business models for service delivery
Italy 2009-2013 more flexibility in labour organization 
introduction of an evaluation system and performance’s reward
Portugal program “reduction and improvement of central 
administration plan” premac (2010-2013)
increase in public sector working time (from 35 to 40 hours in september 2013) reorganising local and 
central government --> the plan established a reduction of 40% of central administration high level 
structures, 27% of the hierarchical levels and optimisation of staff numbers. 
2009 new single pay scheme (linked to individual performance/except in time of wage freezing)
Romania public administration reform 2010-2013 new public pay system (ratio between the national minimum wage and the maximum salary in the 
public sector, rules to govern pay rises, new pay grid…)
Spain public administration reform 2012-2017 restructuring and rationalisation of public sector companies and foundations.
limitations to staff of municipalities: linked to population and set with reference to central government 
reference salaries (2014) 
increase Ļexibility in public employment (internal mobility and ĺring conditions) (2014-2017)
SOURCES: European System of Central Banks.
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